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AGENCY.
Interest is not coupled with the agent's authority, so as to prevent
revocation of the power, where the agency is to loan money for the
principal and collect the interest on the loans, for an annual com-
mission on the existing amount of the loans, to be deducted from the
interest as collected: Oregon W. l'. S. Bank v. American J111ge.
Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. Dist. Oregon, May 7, 1888.
BANKRUPTCY.
Sale of real estate by assignee in bankruptcy, under the United
States Bankruptcy Act, must be made in pursuance of an order of the
Bankrupt Court, in order to discharge incumbrances ; without such
order the assignee sells subject to incumbrances, and a purchaser gets
no better title than the bankrupt had: Lee v. Rogers, S. Ct. App.
W. Va., Sept. 15, 1888.
BANKS AND BANKING.
Check deposited for collection imposes upon a bank the obligation
to return either the check or the money; so, if the collecting bank
surrenders the check to the bank upon which it is drawn, and accepts
a cashier's check in lieu thereof, its liability to its depositor is fixed
as much as if it had received the cash : Fifth National Bank of Pitts-
burgh v. Ashworth, S. Ct. Pa., Jan. 7, 1889.
Deposit in bank may be applied to the payment ofthe depositor's
paper held by the bank for collection, even when the former, after the
deposit of the money, has made a voluntary assignment for the benefit
of creditors: Farmers' Deposit Nat. Bank v. Penn Bank, for use,
etc., S. Ct. Pa., Jan. 7, 1889.
National Bank, deducting usurious interest from the face of a note
discounted, can recover only the face of the note, less the interest de-
ducted ; if the borrower pays the usurious interest in advance, he is
entitled to recover double the interest so paid : Schuyler National
Bank v. Bollong, S. Ct. Neb., Nov. 21, 1888.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Consideration is imported by a promissory note, and the burden of
proof is upon the party alleging the contrary: Flint v. Phipps, S.
Ct. Or., July 2, 1888.
Failure of consideration may be alleged as a defence to a promissory
note given as a retainer to attorneys in a prosecution against the
maker for homicide, when, after the note was given and before trial,
the maker was killed by a mob: Agnew v. Waldon, S. Ct. Ala., July
12, 1888.
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Joint makers of a promissory note may show by parol evidence that
one of them is the principal debtor, and the others are his sureties :
First Nat. Bank of Covington v. Gaines, Ct. App. Ky., Oct. 13,
1888.
Notice of protest is insufficient, where the notary who protests a
note, which has been discounted by a bank, makes inquiry only of
the receiving teller of the bank as to the indorser's residence, and, not
receiving the desired information, mails the notice without further
inquiry to the indorser at the place where the note bears date.
Sweet v. Powers, S. Ct. Mich., Nov. 1, 1888.
Parol evidence that a note was indorsed at the request of the payee,
who promised that the indorser should not be held upon the note, and
that he would look to the maker alone for payment, is admissible to
show want of consideration: Kulenkamp v. Groff, S. Ct. Mich., Oct.
19, 1888.
Parol evidence is inadmissible to show that, when certain promis-
sory notes were made, there was an oral agreement between the parties
that, if the maker should be forced to make an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, the payee should file his claim with the assignee,
and execute a full release of all claims upon the notes beyond the
amount which might be paid under the assignment: Harrison v.
Morrison, S. Ct. Minn., Nov. 2, 1888.
Presentment for payment to maker of a note will be excused, where
the note was made in Minneapolis, Minnesota, no place of payment
being fixed, the payee then residing in that city and the maker in
Wisconsin ; the payee indorsed the note to a third party, who knew
that the maker resided in Wisconsin; but subsequently the maker,
without the knowledge of the holder, removed to Minneapolis, where
he resided at the time the note fell due: Salisbury v. Bartleson, S.
Ct. Minn., Nov. 12, 1888.
Second indorser, who writes his name before, instead of after, that
of a prior indorser, cannot recover from the latter the amount paid in
taking up the note after dishonor: Sweet v. Powers, S. Ct. Mich.,
471.
CITIZENSHIP.
Birth in the United States from Chinese parents, not engaged in
any diplomatic or official capacity under the emperor of China, makes
* the child a citizen of the United States, and this status cannot be
changed by the father during the child's minority; the child must
,have arrived at maturity, and the United States consented, before
citizenship can be lost: Ex parte Chin King, U. S. Cire. Ct. Dist.
Oregon, June 259, 1888.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
All crimes for which trial by jury is provided in Art. IIL Const.
U. S. are not merely felonies or offences punishable by confinement
in the penitentiary, but as well some classes of misdemeanors, the
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punishment of which involves, or may involve, the deprivation of
liberty of the citizen: Callan v. Wilson, S. Ct. U. S., May 14,
1888.
Sixth Amendment to Const. U. S. does not supplant that part of
Art. III. Const. U. S., relating to trial by jury, so as to permit Con-
gress to declare in what way other than by jury persons should be
tried, when accused of crime on the high seas, and in the District of
Columbia, and in places ceded for the seat of government, forts,
magazines, arsenals, and dockyards: Id.
CORPORATIONS.
President of corporation made a promissory note to his own order,
indorsed it, had it discounted, and used the proceeds for the corpora-
tion's benefit; in a suit upon the note by the administratrix of the
president, who had taken it up at maturity, the corporation having
retained the benefit of the transaction, was estopped from denying
the authority of the president to execute the note : Tuscaloosa Cotton-
Seed Oil Co. v. Perry, S. Ct. Ala., June 27, 1888.
Subscription to stock of one corporation by another, unless ex-
pressly authorized by statute, is ultra vires and void: Valley_ R. W.
o. v. Lake Erie Iron Co., S. CL. Ohio, Oct. 16,1888.
CRIiNAL LAW.
Reversal of conviction for crime and the awarding of a new trial,
upon appeal by defendant, will not bar further prosecution on the
same charge, though defendant in his appeal did not ask for a new
trial, but only for a reversal and his discharge from imprisonment:
People v. Travers, S. Ct. Cal., Sept. 28, 1888.
DAMAGES.
False and fraudulent representation by the agent of a railroad
company that the physician of a person, who had been injured through
the company's negligence, had stated that her injuries would soon be.
cured with proper treatment, by reason of which representation she
was induced to sign a release of her claim for damages, is sufficient
ground for the rescission of the release, notwithstanding thp fact that
she may have entertained doubts as to the correctness of the alleged
Qpinion of the physiian: Peterson v. Chicago, ff. B y.' P. .
Co., S. Ct. Minn., June 12, 1888.
Recovery cannot be had against a railroad company for cutting
across a ditch embankment in the construction of its line and thereby
draining more surface water into the ditch than it could hold and
flooding the adjoining lawd, the owner of the land having already re-
ceived damages for the taking of the land where the road was con-
structed, including "t h e legal incidental damages to the land not
taken": Bell's Bx'rs v. .Norfolk S. R. Co., S. Ct. N. C., Oct. 8, 1888.
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ELECTIONS.
Reection of returns from certain townships by a board of can-
vassers, whose action is conclusive upon no one, is immaterial to the
determination of an issue to test the rights to the office in question:
Gatling v. Boone, S. Ct. N. C., Oct. 8, 1888.
EVIDENCE.
Certifed copy of deed for lands in Georgia, though authenticated
as required by Act of Congress, is not admissible in evidence in Ala-
bama, without proof of the loss or destruction of the original, as
under the statutes of Georgia it would not be admissible in that State
without such proof: Whann v. Atkinson, S. Ct. Ala., July 16, 1888.
Hypothetical questions to medical experts may assume any state of
facts which there is evidence tending to prove; in such a question,
embodying a patient's assumed symptoms and condition, the expert
may be asked what, in his judgment, is the probability of recovery:
Peterson v. Chicago N. - St. P. By. Co., S. Ct. Minn., June 12,
1888.
On cross-examination of a witness he was asked, in language
hardly proper, whether his testimony was not ihise, and resented the
question; he was then asked whether certain statements made by him
were not without foundation in fact; the Court, in the exercise of its
authority to prevent unseemly scenes between counsel and witness,
properly sustained an objection to the latter question and stopped the
course of the examination: Baldwin v. St. Louis K.. N W. By. Co.,
S. Ct. Iowa, Oct. 2, 1888.
FIRE INSURANCE.
Additional insurance was procured by the insured on the represen-
tation of an agent that it would be all righit-the original policy pro-
viding that, if the insurer should procure such additional insurance
without the consent of the company, the policy should be void, and
that the agent had no authority to modify any of its conditions. The
company was not estopped from denying liability, although the insured
had never seen the policy, and although the agent had authority in a
certain way to consent to additional insurance, and had done so in
other cases, but had not consented in this instance in the manner pre-
scribed by the policy: Cleaver v. Traders' Ins. Co., S. Ct. Mich.,
Oct. 5, 1888.
Waiver of condition of policy, where there is evidence from which
it may be found, is a question for the jury. Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Claim for services by a woman who married a man, supposing
him to be unmarried, and lived with him as his wife until his death,
tut who learned afterwards that he had a former wife living, and not
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divorced, at the time of the marriage, cannot be sustained against his
administrator: Cooper v. Cooper, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., Sept. 5, 1868.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE LAW.
Car properly adapted to carry the quantity designated should be
furnished by the carrier, when a carload lot in weight, or quantity is
defined and a rate designated : the shipper cannot lawfully be re-
quired to go to any expense in fitting up the car : Rice et al. v. W. N.
. 4r Pa. R. B. Co. The Commission, December 3, 1888.
Interchange of traffic, through the customary reasonable and equal
facilities, cannot be denied by one railroad to another on the ground
that the latter supplies no public necessity: all railroads authorized
by competent public authority must be conclusively presumed to be
conveniences: Ky. * Ind. B. Co. v. L. 4- . R. R. Co. The Com-
mission, August 2, 1888.
Reasonableness and justice of rates must be determined not alone
by the exigencies of the complainant's business, but with due regard
for the circumstances of the carrier as well. The rate challenged
may be high for the distance hauled, if that only be regarded, but it
is not a violation of the law for the carrier to accept a less division
of a through rate for traffic going over its road than the charges to
the stations it serves; the circumstances and conditions are substan-
tially different and the service entirely dissimilar: Rice et al. v. W.
. Y. 4- Pa. R. R. Co. The Commission, December 3, 1888.
JUDGMENTS.
Assignment of judgment in action of tort cannot be made before
the judgment has been actually entered, even though a verdict has
been rendered upon which judgment may be, and is afterwards
signed: Gamble v. Central R. 4- Banking Co., S. Ct. Ga., July 11,
1888.
JURISDICTION.
Forgery by officers of a national bank who, with intent to deceive
the United States bank examiner, forge a promissory note and enter
it upon the books of the bank as assets, may be tried in the State
Courts, notwithstanding the fact that the Federal Courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction to determine the falsity of the entries: State v. White,
S. Ct. N. C., Nov. 5, 1888.
State Courts may entertain jurisdiction of suits brought against
national banks under sections 5197 and 5198 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States, to recover the penalty for charging usurious in-
terest: Schuyler National Bank v. Bollong, S. Ct. Neb., Nov. 21,
1888.
LIBE.
Pleadings addressed to and filed in a Conrt of competent jurisd'c.
tion, which are pertinent and material to the relief sought, whether
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legally sufficient to obtain it or not, are absolutely privileged, and,
however false and malicious, are not libellous: Wilson v. Sullivan,
S. Ct. Ga., May 23, 1888.
LiFE IxSURANE.
Bylaw of mutual benefit society, which conflicts with the terms
of the policy, the society having power under its charter to issue such
a policy, will be construed to have been waived in favor of the assured,
and the provisions of the policy will determine the right of the parties,
notwithstanding the by-law : Davidson v. Old Pecple'a Nut. Ben.
Soc., S. Ct. Minn., Oct. 16, 1888.
Drunkenness cannot be set up as a defence by a mutual benefit
association which issued a certificate, containing a provision avoiding
it, if the assured should use alcoholic stimulants to the injury of his
health, to a person known to its agent to be a confirmed drunkard:
Newman v. Covenant AMut. Ben. Assn., S. Ct. Iowa, Oct. 26, 1888.
LIMITATION.
Acknowledgment sufficient to remove the bar of the statute from a
particular note, is not shown by a letter which, after alluding to
"those old notes," concluded, "I have no money now, but you shall
have every cent that is due on them :" Stout v. Marshall, S. Ct.
Iowa, Oct. 13, 1888.
Indorsement on note made and signed by debtor, after it has become
barred by limitation, in these words, "I hereby acknowledge the in-
debtedness of this note," takes the note out of the operation of the
statute: Drake v. Sigafoos, S. Ct. Minn., Nov. 12, 1888.
Government suits to revoke land patents for fraud and misrepresen-
tation may be met by pleas of the Statute of Limitations and laches,
when the United States is only a nominal plaintiff, did not own the
lands, has no real interest in the controversy, and is prosecuting the
actions for the sole benefit of private persons: U. S. v. Beebe, S.
Ct., U. S., April 30, 1888.
Running of statute in favor of bailee does not begin until he denies
the bailment and converts the property: Reizenstein v. Marquardt,
- S. Ct. Iowa, Oct. 2, 1888.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Door boij, employed in coal-mine, whose duty was at a given signal.
to open and shut the door through which cars passed into and out of
the mine, was killed by several loose cars starting of their own ac-
cord, without warning or signal, by reason of their brakes being
defective; at the time but one brakeman, or "spragger," instead of
two, as was customary, was in charge of the cars: no contributory
negligence being shown, the employer was liable: Southwest Va. Imp.
Co. v. Smith's Admr., S. Ct. App. Va., Aug. 23, 1888.
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NEGLIGENCE.
Contributory negligence is chargeable to a boy of ten and a half
years and of average intelligence, who had been frequently in the
vicinity of a railway turn-table, had a general knowledge of its struc-
ture and operation, had been repeatedly warned by his father that it
was dangerous to play upon it and told not to do so, and who knew
that the railroad company prohibited children from going upon the
turn-table, but who, nevertheless, went upon it, and played there with
other boys, and was in consequence injured: Twist v. Winona and
St. P. R. R. Co., S. Ct. Minn., Aug. 30, 1888.
Contributory negligence will not be imputed, as matter of law, to a
person injured after dark by a defect in a street, although he knew
that such defect existed, but not that it was dangerous; the question
is for the jury: C'ty of Richmond v. Mulholland, S. Ct. I1., Nov.
26, 1888.
County agriculural society, which has constructed seats on its fair-
ground for the use of its patrons, is liable in its corporate capacity
to an action for damages by a person who, while attending a fair held
by it, and rightfully occupying the seats, sustains dn injury by reason
of the negligent construction of such seats: Dunn v. Brown Co. Ag-
ricultural Society, S. Ct. Ohio, Nov. 13, 1888.
Ordinary care must have been exercised by one who has been
injured by the negligent operation of a machine by another, in order
to entitle him to recover for the injuries sustained, even though there
has been gross negligence on the part of the person causing the injury:
Willard v. Swanson, S. Ct. Ill., Nov. 
15, 1888.
Vicious animal, permitted by its owner to run at large, while tres-
passing in company with stock belonging to another person upon
uninclosed land owned by neither, killed one of the latter's colts; the
owner of the colt was entitled to recover its value, notwithstanding
the fact that it was also technically trespassing upon the land of
another person: Hill v. Applegate, S. Ct. Kan., Oct. 6, 1888.
PRIVILEGE.
Service of summons cannot be made upon a person attending the
bearing of an application for an injunction in a case in which he is
interested as a party, in a county other than that of his residence,
while he is going to, attending, or returning from such hearing:
Andrews v. Lembeck, S. Ct. Ohio, Oct. 16, 1888.
PUBLIC OFFICERS.
County treasurer cannot be required by mandamus to pay over to
a railway company funds received by his predecessor for the benefit
of the company and transferred by him to the county fund, in the
absence of proof that the money was ever transferred to the former,
or was actually or presumptively in his possession: Minneapolis and
St. L. y. Co. v. Becket, S. Ct. Iowa, Sept. 8, 1888.
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.1'ish inspector of a city, whose duty it is to inspect all fish offered
for -ale, and destroy such as are unwholesome and unfit to be eaten,
has judicial duties and powers, and, while acting within his jurisdic-
tion, is not liable for the careless, improper, or erroneous performance
of his duties, although he knew his unfitness for the position: .ath
v. Koeppel, S. Ct. Wis., Oct. 9, 1888.
RAILROADS.
Brakeman on freight train, in going between two cars to make a
coupling, was compelled to stoop in order to avoid the projecting
lumber piled on one of the cars, and stumbled, fell, and was killed;
although the car was improperly loaded, the brakeman might have
observed the danger, and have rightfully refused to go between the
cars, and therefore the company was not liable: Brice v. Louisville
and N. R. Co., Ct. App. Ky., Sept. 29, 1888.
Bridge, elevated four feet nine inches above the top of a freight
car, on a part of the road where brakemen are required to pass over
the top of cars in applying the brakes upon moving trains, not only
in the daytime, but also when the night is dark and foggy, and it
would be impossible to know of the proximity of the bridge, is not a
risk ordinarily and naturally incident to the service, and the company
maintaining it is guilty of negligence: Louisville . A. 4 0. R. R.
Co. v. Wright, S. Ct. Ind., June 20, 1888.
Engineer was sent by the railroad employing him with one of its
engines to haul temporarily for another company trains of the latter
over its track, and was injured by an accident resulting from the bad
condition of the latter company's track; the employer company was
not liable for such injury: Dunlap v. Richmond and A. R. Co., S.
Ct. Ga., July 11, 1888.
Fire, originating from sparks from a locomotive, destroyed hay
stacked in a field beside the railroad; the railroad was liable for the
damage, unless the jury found that the employ~s of the railroad who
were in charge of the locomotive were competent and skilful, and
that the locomotive itself was properly equipped and operated: Bul-
liss v. Chicago ff. 4 St. P. Ry. Co., S. Ct., Iowa, Sept. 8, 1888.
WILLS.
Life estate only is given to a wife by a devise to her by her hus-
band, who died childless, of his house and lot and "all the rest and
residue" of his estate, "to have and to hold for and during the term
of her natural life," although she is spoken of elsewhere in the will as
the residuary legatee, and no disposition of the remainder is made:
Mixter v. Woodcock, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., Nov. 27, 1888.
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